We consider a basic resource allocation game, where the players' strategy spaces are subsets of R m and cost/utility functions are parameterized by some common vector u ∈ R m and, otherwise, only depend on the own strategy choice. A strategy of a player can be interpreted as a vector of resource consumption and a joint strategy profile naturally leads to an aggregate consumption vector. Resources can be priced, that is, the game is augmented by a price vector λ ∈ R m + and players have quasi-linear overall costs/utilities meaning that in addition to the original costs/utilities, a player needs to pay the corresponding price per consumed unit. We investigate the following question: for which aggregated consumption vectors u can we find prices λ that induce an equilibrium realizing the targeted consumption profile?
Introduction
Resource allocation problems play a key role in our society. Whenever available resources need to be matched to demands, the goal is to find the most profitable or least costly allocation of the resources. Applications can be found in several areas, including traffic networks ( [7, 49, 63, 69, 77] ), telecommunication networks ( [45, 70] ), and economics ( [53, 55, 75] ). In most of the above applications, a finite (or infinite) number of players interact strategically, each optimizing their individual objective function. The corresponding allocation of resources in such setting is usually determined by an equilibrium solution of the underlying strategic game.
A central question in all these areas concerns the problem of how to incentivize players in order to use the (scarce) resources optimally. One key approach in all named application areas is the concept of pricing resources according to their usage. Every resource comes with an anonymous prices per unit of consumption and defining the "right" prices thus offers the chance of inducing equilibria with optimal or efficient resource usage. Prominent examples are toll pricing in transportation networks (see, e.g., [8, 13, 31, 27, 78] ), congestion pricing in telecommunication networks (cf. [51, 45, 70] ) and market pricing or combinatorial auctions in economics (cf. [39, 47, 53] ). A prime example of the latter, is the Walrasian competitive equilibrium (cf. Walras [75] ), where goods are priced such that there is an allocation of goods to buyers with the property that every buyer gets a bundle of items maximizing her overall utility given the current prices for the goods.
In this paper, we will introduce a generic model of pricing in resource allocation games that subsumes several of the above mentioned applications as a special case. In the following, we first introduce the model formally, discuss applications and then give an overview on the main results and related work.
The Model
Let E = {1, . . . , m} be a finite and non-empty set of resources and N = {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of players. For i ∈ N , let X i ⊂ R m , X i ∅ denote the strategy space of player i and define X := X i as the combined strategy space. In the following, vectors x i = (x ij ) j∈E ∈ X i are denoted in bold face. The entry x ij can be interpreted as the level of resource consumption of player i for resource j. For the moment, we do not require non-negativity of the entries of x i . Let x = (x ij ) ∈ R n·m denote the vector of resource consumption of all players that we also call a strategy distribution. For a strategy distribution x, we define the load on resource j ∈ E as j (x) := i∈N x ij .
In the following, we introduce properties of utility functions needed for our main results. We will distinguish between cost minimization games and utility maximization games and start with the former. Assumption 1.1. We assume that cost/utility functions are parameterized by an exogenously given vector u ∈ R m and depend on the own strategy vector only.
1. For minimization games G min (u) with respect to u ∈ R m , the total cost of a player i ∈ N under strategy distribution x ∈ X is defined by a function cost i : X → R, which satisfies cost i (x) := π i (u, x i ) for all x ∈ X for some function π i : R m × X i → R.
strategy distribution (overall flow) as an equilibrium, see [8, 27, 31, 78] for just a few works in the transportation and computer science literature. One important aspect of these two different models is that in the atomic model, the set of flows X i carries integrality requirements while the non-atomic formulation usually involves convex sets X i . Let us emphasize that most models in the area of network routing assume that the cost of a player (or an agent) only depends on the own strategy choice and the aggregate load vector induced by the strategies of the competitors. Moreover for nonatomic models, an agent cannot influence the load vector by her own strategy choice. In this regard, only nonatomic games seem to fit into the class of games G min (u) augmented with prices introduced in Assumption 1.1. But as we will see later, also atomic congestion games can be handled.
Now we turn to the area of Walrasian market equilibria which constitutes a central topic in the economics literature, see the original work of Walras [75] and later landmark papers of Kelso and Crawford [47] , Gul and Stachetti [39] and Danilov et al. [25] . Example 1.4 (Market Equilibria). Suppose there are items E = {1, . . . , m} for sale and there is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of buyers interested in buying some of the items. For every subset S ⊆ E of items, player i experiences value v i (S) ∈ R giving rise to a valuation function v i : 2 m → R, i ∈ N, where 2 m represents the set of all subsets of E. The market manager wants to determine a price vector λ ∈ R m + so that all items are sold to the players and every player demands a subset S i ⊆ E maximizing her quasi-linear utility: S i ∈ arg max S⊆E {w i (S) − j∈S λ j }. This is known as a Walrasian competitive equilibrium.
This class of games also belongs to the class G max (u) augmented with prices introduced in Assumption 1.1, because the valuation function of a buyer only depends on her own assigned bundle of items. If X i , i ∈ N represents the set of incidence vectors of subsets of E, we can set u = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R m and any pair x ∈ X, λ ∈ R m + that enforces u corresponds to a competitive equilibrium. Several further variants are known in the literature according to whether items are divisible or not and if allocations of items need to satisfy further combinatorial or algebraical constraints. As we will show later, the introduced framework allows several generalizations, such as letting the valuation function also depend on the aggregated vector of allocations of other players.
The next application resides in the area of congestion control in communication networks and exhibits joint elements of the two previous models: the model is a maximization game but the strategy space carries a network structure as in transportation systems.
Example 1.5 (Congestion Control in Communication Networks)
. We consider a model of Kelly et al. [45] in the domain of TCP-based congestion control. We are given a directed or undirected capacitated graph G = (V, E, c), where V are the nodes, E the edge set and c ∈ R m + denotes the edge capacities. There is a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and each i ∈ N is associated with an end-to-end pair (s i , t i ) ∈ V × V and a non-decreasing and concave bandwidth utility function U i : R + → R + measuring the received benefit from sending net flow from s i to t i . The strategy space X i of a player represents a flow polyhedron and for a flow x i ∈ X i with value val(x i ) the received bandwidth utility is equal to U i (val(x i )). The goal in this setting is to determine a price vector λ ∈ R m + so that a strategy distribution x * is induced as an equilibrium respecting the network capacities c and, hence, avoids congestion. The equilibrium condition is given by
This model fits to the class G max (u) augmented with prices: The utility function of a player only depends on the own action and with u := c we obtain the desired structure. For maximization problems over network flows, it is clear that in a capacitated graph only bottleneck edges are saturated, thus, the goal is to determine a price vector λ ∈ R m + so that the network capacities are weakly enforced.
Overview of Results and Organization of the Paper
In Section 1.1 and 1.2, we introduced a resource allocation model and motivated the question of enforceability of load vectors induced by equilibrium profiles with respect to anonymous resource prices.
In Section 2, we will develop a duality-based framework and our first main result (Theorem 2.3) states that a load vector u is enforceable by prices λ if and only if an associated optimization problem has zero duality gap and there is an optimal solution satisfying an inequality with equality. In Section 2.3 we strengthen this result by allowing to consider extended formulations and in Section 2.4 we discuss implications for secondary optimization problems over the price/allocation space enforcing a load vector.
The strength of these results is that they impose virtually no assumptions on the structure of feasible strategy sets nor on the utility/cost functions except for their special structure and the conditions on the duality gap. In the application domains of traffic networks, markets and congestion control, many existence results of enforcing prices are also based on duality arguments but most of these results are tailored to their specific setting. We see our model as a first step towards a unifying approach.
Using the main characterization as a blue print, we then consider in Section 3 the case of integrality conditions of strategy spaces. It follows that for problems admitting a fractional relaxation with zero duality gap and integer optimal solutions, the sufficiency condition of Theorem 2.3 is satisfied. For polyhedral integral strategy spaces, the powerful methods from polyhedral combinatorics can be used to categorize cases for which such relaxations exist. In this regard, we show two prototypical results:
1. Theorem 3.7 gives an enforceability result for games with homogenous linear utilities/costs and (box) totally-dual-integral and decomposable aggregation polytopes.
2. Theorem 3.8 gives an enforceability result for games with player-specific linear utilities/costs on polymatroidal strategy spaces.
With these results and methods at hand, we apply the framework to the three application domains. Then we turn to atomic congestion games. For general nondecreasing homogeneous cost functions, we show that polytopal congestion games can be analyzed using Theorem 3.7. It turns out that for a wide classes of congestion games (matroid games, single-source network games, r-arborescences, matching games, and more) the defining aggregation polytope is box-integral and decomposable leading to existence results of enforcing tolls (Theorem 4.5). For all these settings, a congestion vector u minimizing the social cost can be computed in polynomial time (see Del Pia et al. [61] and Kleer and Schäfer [48] ) and the space of enforcing prices can be described by a compact linear formulation. It follows that for a fixed enforceable capacity vector u, arbitrary linear objective functions (like maximum or minimum revenue) can be efficiently optimized over the price/allocation space. Besides single-source network games (see Fotakis and Spirakis [34] and Fotakis et al. [33] ), these results were not known before.
Then, we study the more challenging case of atomic congestion games with nondecreasing playerspecific cost functions on the resources. We prove -using our result on polymatroids -that for polymatroidal strategy spaces, one can obtain existence results (Theorem 4.6). To the best of our knowledge, these are the first existence results of tolls for congestion games with player-specific cost functions. We complement this result by showing in Theorem 4.7 that already the case of homogenous cost functions with heterogeneous players is considerably harder than the purely homogenous case: even for symmetric s,t network games the corresponding (compact) LP-relaxation cannot be integral (unless P = N P ).
Market equilibria. In Section 5, we study (indivisible) single and multi-item markets and show that the existence of Walrasian equilibria can be studied within the framework. We reprove with two different proofs a classical existence result of equilibria for gross-substitute valuations. One proof is based on the methods of discrete convexity and M -convexity (see Murota [56] ) while the other uses LP-duality. Both proofs are known in the literature but we embed them here under the same roof.
Then we consider a class of valuations for multi-unit items that we term separable additive valuations with negative externalities. The idea is that items are of different type but may be sold at a certain multiplicity and the values for received items are additive. The precise item values may depend on the allocation vector. This dependency is assumed to model negative externalities, that is, -roughly speaking -if an item type is sold to more players, the value goes down. For this class of valuations, we prove in Theorem 5.6 that for general polymatroidal environments, Walrasian equilibria exist. We also study homogeneous separable additive valuations with externalities, where the value of every player i for an item of type j under allocation vector x is equal and given by a nonincreasing function of the number of sold items. In Theorem 5.7, we obtain similar existence results as for atomic congestion games, e.g., for single-source network games, r-arborescences and matching games, there exist Walrasian equilibria.
Congestion control in communication networks.
In the final Section 6, we consider congestion control problems in communication networks using a flow-based model proposed by Kelly et al. [45] . We first reprove an existence result of enforceable capacity vectors of Kelly et al. [45] . Then, we turn to the much less explored model of integral flows, where a discrete unit-packet size is given. With the machinery of polyhedral combinatorics, we prove that for single-source networks with identical linearly increasing bandwidth utility functions, every nonnegative capacity vector is weakly enforceable (Theorem 6.2).
Related Work
As outlined in the introduction, the topic of pricing resources concerns different streams of literature and it seems impossible to give a complete overview here. The idea of using Lagrangian multipliers is as old as optimization itself and their use in terms of shadow prices measuring the change of the optimal value function for marginally increased right-hand sides is well-known -assuming some constraint qualification conditions, see for instance Boyd and Vandenberghe [15] .
Our first main result (Theorem 2.3) relies on a decomposition property of the Lagrangian (for separable problems) and the use of Lagrange multipliers for pricing the resources. This approach is not new and has been developed before, see for instance Bertsekas and Ghallager [9] and Palomar and Chiang [60] . In particular, motivated by the dual-decomposition of the convex programming formulation of the bandwidth allocation problem of Kelly et al. [45] , Palomar and Chiang [60] described how the Lagrangian of a general separable optimization problem
can be decomposed into n independent problems. The difference of this model to ours is the parameterization of the cost/utility functions π i (u, x i ) with respect to the capacity vector u. This degree of freedom is a strict generalization and allows to model dependencies of targeted capacity vectors with respect to the intrinsic cost/utilities -a prime example appears in nonatomic congestion games, where the cost function of an agent only depends on the aggregated load vector. Moreover, this dependency allows to model externalities with respect to allocations which are not possible in the model of Palomar and Chiang [60] .
In the following, the related work is organized according to the three application areas: tolls in traffic networks, market equilibria and congestion control in communications.
Tolls in Traffic Networks
. A large body of work in the area of transportation networks is concerned with congestion toll pricing, see for example Knight [49] , Beckmann et al. [7] , Smith [69] , and Hearn et al. [43] . Beckmann et al. [7] showed that for the Wardrop model with homogeneous users, charging the difference between the marginal cost and the real cost in the socially optimal solution (marginal cost pricing) leads to an equilibrium flow which is optimal. Cole et al. [20] considered the case of heterogeneous users, that is, users value latency relative to monetary cost differently. For singlecommodity networks, the authors showed the existence of tolls that induce an optimal flow as Nash flow. Yang and Huang [78] , Fleischer et al. [31] and Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [44] proved that there are tolls inducing an optimal flow for heterogenous users even in general networks -all proofs are based on linear programming duality. Swamy [72] and Yang and Zhang [79] proved the existence of optimal tolls for the atomic splittable model using convex programming duality.
For atomic (unsplittable) network congestion games much less is known regarding the existence of tolls. Caragiannis et al. [19] studied the existence of tolls for singleton congestion games. Fotakis and Spirakis [34] proved the existence of tolls inducing any acyclic integral flow for symmetric s,t network games with homogeneous players. Fotakis et al. [33] further extended this result to heterogeneous players and networks with a common source but different sinks. Marden et al. [52] transferred the idea of charging marginal cost tolls to congestion games and showed the existence of tolls enforcing the load vector of a socially optimal strategy distribution.
Market Equilibria. Walrasian market equilibria constitute a central topic in economics. For the problem of allocating indivisible single-unit items, there are several characterizations of the existence of equilibria related to the gross-substitute property of valuations, see Kelso and Crawford [47] , Gul and Stachetti [39] and Ausubel and Milgrom [4] . Several works established connections of the equilibrium existence problem w.r.t. LP-duality and integrality (see Bikchandani and Mamer [12] and Shapley and Shubik [66] ). Murota and Tamura [57, 56] established connections between the gross substitutability property and M-convexity properties of demand sets and valuations. Yokote [80] recently proved that the existence of Walrasian equilibria follows from a duality property in discrete convexity.
For multi-unit items, several recent papers studied the existence of Walrasian equilibria. Danilov et al. [25] investigated the existence of Walrasian equilibria in multi-unit auctions and identified general conditions on the demand sets and valuations related to discrete convexity. The conditions of Milgrom and Struluvici [54] and Ausubel [3] appear as special cases of those in [25] . Baldwin and Klemperer [6] explored a connection with tropical geometry and gave necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium in product-mix auctions of indivisible goods. This result is also closely related to the work of Danilov, Koshevoy, and Murota [25] , see also Sun and Yang [71] . Tran and Yu [73] gave a new proof of the sufficiency condition of [6] using a unimodularity theorem in integer programming. For a comparison of the above works especially with respect to the role of discrete convexity, we refer to the excellent survey of Shioura and Tamura [67] . Candogan et al. [17, 18] showed that valuations classes (beyond GS valuations) based on graphical structures also imply the existence of Walrasian equilibria. Their proof uses integrality of optimal solutions of an associated linear min-cost flow formulation.
Our existence result for polymatroid environments differs to these previous works in the sense that we allow valuations to depend on the allocation of items to other players (negative externalities). Much fewer works allow for externalities in valuation functions, see for instance Zame and Noguchi [81] . Models with positive (network-based) externalities have been considered by Candogan et al. [16] . Bhattacharya et al. [10] considered a setting with weighted negative network-based externalities and unit-demand buyers. Bikchandani et al. [11] consider a problem of selling a base of polymatroid. In their model, however, the prices are not anonymous (rather VCG) for several items of the same type. The same holds true for Goel et al. [38] who also consider polymatroids even with budget constraints. Feldman et al. [30] proposed the notion of combinatorial Walrasian equilibria, where items can be packed a priori into bundles. This ensures the existence of equilibria with approximately optimal welfare guarantees. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [64] linked the equilibrium existence of Walrasian equilibria with the computational complexity of the allocation and demand problems.
Congestion Control. Kelly et al. [45] proposed to model congestion control via analyzing optimal solutions of a convex optimization problem, where an aggregated bandwidth utility subject to network capacity constraints is maximized. By dualizing the problem and then decomposing terms (as we do in this paper), it is shown that Lagrangian multipliers correspond to equilibrium enforcing congestion prices. For an overview on more related work in this area, we refer to the book by Srikant [70] . Kelly and Vazirani [46] drew connections between market equilibrium computation and the congestion control model of Kelly. Cominetti et al. [21] also studied the convex programming formulation of Kelly et al. and established connections to the Wardrop equilibrium model. The most obvious difference of these work to ours is that they assume convex strategy spaces and concave utility functions. Our framework allows to add integrality conditions or non-convexities to the model.
Connection to Duality Gaps in Optimization
In the following, we distinguish between cost minimization problems and utility maximization problems. We explicitly prove our main results in the realm of cost minimization but all arguments carry directly over to the maximization case. For later referral, we summarize the results for the maximization case at the end of the section.
Cost Minimization Problems
To this end we define the following minimization problem:
where the objective function is defined as π(
The Lagrangian function for problem P min (u) becomes
and we can define the Lagrangian-dual as:
We assume that
is not bounded from below on X. The dual problem is defined as:
Definition 2.1. Problem P min (u) has zero-duality gap, if there is λ * ∈ R m + and x * ∈ X with π(x * ) = µ(λ * ). In this case, we say that the pair (x * , λ * ) is primal-dual optimal.
Clearly, if problem P min (u) has zero-duality gap, the two solutions λ * ∈ R m + and x * ∈ X are optimal for their respective problems D min (u) and P min (u) and infima/suprema in the definition of µ become a minimum/maximum and the infimum in P min (u) becomes a minimum. We now show a key structure, namely that the Lagrangian dual can be decomposed into n independent subproblems. This decomposition step is similar to that of Palomar and Chiang [60] , however, we use it for more general cost/utility functions.
For a problem of type P min (u), the following holds true:
Proof. We calculate:
where the first equality follows by the linearity of (x) and the last equality by the assumption that π i (u, x i ) only depends on x i ∈ X i . Because taking the infimum is independent of the constant − m j=1 λ j u j , the lemma follows.
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 2.3. A capacity vector u ∈ R m is enforceable if and only if P min (u) has zero duality gap and
there is an optimal solution x * for P min (u) satisfying (1) with equality.
Proof. ⇐: By definition, zero duality gap implies that there are
and both solutions are optimal for their respective problems. Since x * is primal feasible and satisfies (1) with equality, we get x * ∈ X and (x * ) = u, thus, Condition 1. in Definition 1.2 is satisfied. It remains to prove Condition 2. With x * ∈ arg min x∈X L(x, λ * ) we get
⇒: Let u ∈ R m be enforceable by some x * ∈ X and λ * ∈ R m + , that is, (x * , λ * ) satisfy (x * ) = u and
where (3) follows from the definition of π(x) and the linearity of (x), (4) follows because π i (u, x i ) only depends on x i , (5) uses that (x * , λ * ) enforce u and (6) uses u = (x * ). Hence, strong duality holds for the pair (x * , λ * ).
It is remarkable that the above result does not rely on any assumption on the feasible sets X i or on the functions π i (u, x i ), i ∈ N as long as P min (u) has zero duality gap and admits an optimal solution that fulfils (1) with equality. In the optimization literature, several classes of optimization problems are known to have zero duality gap even without convexity of feasible sets and objective functions, see for instance Zheng et al. [82] .
For weak enforceability, we obtain the following straight-forward corollary.
Corollary 2.4. A capacity vector u ∈ R m is weakly enforceable if P min (u) has zero duality gap.
In cost minimization games, the feasible sets X i usually contain some sort of covering conditions on the resource consumption. For example in network routing, one needs to send some prescribed amount of flow. In this regard, we introduce a natural candidate set of vectors u for which we know that any feasible solution satisfying (1) does so with equality.
where h j : R → R, j ∈ E are strictly increasing functions.
The above definition has been previously used by Fleischer et al. [31] in the context of enforcing tolls in nonatomic congestion games. Theorem 2.6. Let u ∈ R m be minimal for X. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. u is enforceable via price vector λ * ∈ R m + and x * ∈ X.
The only difference to Theorem 2.3 is that by minimality of u, we get (x) = u for any feasible solution of P min (u), therefore, tightness of inequality (1) is already satisfied.
Let us now consider the important special case of convex optimization problems.
Corollary 2.7. Let X i , i ∈ N be nonempty convex sets and assume that π i (u, x i ), i ∈ N are convex functions over X i . Let u ∈ R m be minimal and suppose there exists x 0 ∈ relint(X) ∩ {x| (x) ≤ u}, where relint(X) denotes the relative topological interior of X. Then, u is enforceable.
Proof. For P min (u), we have a convex objective over non-empty convex sets X i , i ∈ N intersected by an affine half-space. Since P min (u) is feasible and Slater's constrained qualification condition (cf. Slater [68] ) is satisfied we get that P min (u) has zero duality gap and the result follows from Theorem 2.6.
The above result can also be interpreted as a special case of the second welfare theorem (which also relies on convexity), see Arrow [2] and Debreu [26] .
Utility Maximization Problems
Now we turn to utility maximization problems and define the following analogous problem:
where the objective function is defined as
The Lagrangian function for problem P max (u) becomes
is not bounded from above on X. The dual problem is defined as:
We obtain the following analogous results to those of Section 2.1.
Theorem 2.8. Consider a problem of type P max (u). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
2. P max (u) has zero duality gap and there is an optimal solution x * for P max (u) satisfying (1) with equality.
Moreover, a supply vector u ∈ R m is weakly enforceable, if P max (u) has zero duality gap.
In maximization games, the sets X i usually contain some capacity restrictions, therefore the notion of minimality of vectors u might not be appropriate. Take for instance the example of auctions in Example 1.4. Here, u = 0 arises as the unique minimal u leading to trivial conclusions. Perhaps more interesting are scenarios in which the combined valuation function v(x) is in some sense monotonically non-decreasing on X. Definition 2.9 (Upwards closure of X, Monotonicity of valuations). X is upwards-closed w.r.t. u ∈ R m , if (x) ≤ u and (x) u for some x ∈ X implies that there is x ∈ X with x ≥ x and (x ) = u. We say that X is upwards-closed, if this property holds for all u ∈ R m . The function v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing on X, if v(x) ≥ v(y) for all x, y ∈ X with x ≥ y.
We obtain the following result regarding this monotonicity assumption. Proof. By the monotonicity of v(x) and upwards-closedness of X w.r.t. u, any optimal solution of P max (u) can be turned into one that satisfies (1) with equality.
We finally get an existence result for convex sets X i , i ∈ N and monotone and concave valuations.
Corollary 2.11. Let X i , i ∈ N be nonempty convex sets so that X is upwards-closed w.r.t. u ∈ R m . Assume that v i , i ∈ N are concave functions and v(x) is monotonically non-decreasing and that there exist x 0 ∈ relint(X) ∩ {x| (x) ≤ u}, Then, u is enforceable.
Extended Formulations
So far we assumed that for every player i ∈ N , the strategy space lies in R m , i.e., X i ⊂ R m . For some applications, it makes sense to lift the strategy space into a higher-dimensional space by introducing additional variables. The field of extended formulations considers the power of obtaining "better" such formulations. Our model can easily incorporate such a lifting. For i ∈ N , we can allow for strategy spaces X i ⊂ R m+k i for some k i ∈ N with the notation (x i , y i ) ∈ X i , where as before x i ∈ R m and additionally y i ∈ R k i . Moreover, we define X := i∈N X i . A cost/utility function gets now three arguments
It should be clear that the previous results directly carry over to the lifted version so we do not repeat them here. In the main body of the paper, we mostly drop the lifting variable y i in order to keep notation simple. Only when needed -see for instance Section 5.1 -we refer to the lifted variant.
Optimizing Over Enforceable Allocations and Prices
We briefly discuss here algorithmic consequences of Theorem 2.3. If a problem class satisfies the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 2.3, one can optimize arbitrary real-valued functions V (λ, x) over the allocation/price space enforcing a load vector u. Such an optimization problem looks as:
In this formulation, the constraints ensure that any feasible solution (x, λ) is a pair of primal-dual optimal solutions that satisfy (x) = u as required in Theorem 2.3. If for instance the problems P min (u) and D min (u) are polynomially-sized linear programs, and the objective V (λ, x) is linear (or convex), we can efficiently solve OPT(λ, x). More generally, it suffices to have a polynomial separation oracle for the linear system described by the combined primal-dual linear system. Relevant functions V (λ, x) may be revenue functions or general social welfare functions. In the following Sections 4,5 and 6 we describe such algorithmic results.
Integral Resource Allocation Problems
Now we pay special attention to problems with integrality of feasible strategies. In many resource allocation problems, feasible strategies are constrained to be integral -prime examples appear in congestion games, where players select {0, 1} vectors representing subsets of resources (within a collection of allowable subsets) or combinatorial auctions, where players are interested in buying indivisible items possibly satisfying further combinatorial properties. Note that for Theorems 2.3 and 2.6 we did not assume any topological properties of the sets X i , i ∈ N a priori, except the conditions on the zero duality gap and the existence of a minimal u. In particular, these results remain valid for integral sets X i ⊂ Z m . However, due to their practical importance and given that there is a large body of literature investigating duality gaps for integral optimization problems, we analyze this special case in more detail. We assume in the following that the strategy spaces of players i ∈ N satisfy
The original problem P min (u) then becomes an optimization problem with integer constraints:
We call the following optimization problem a convex fractional relaxation.
where R(X) ⊂ R n·m convex and has the property R(X) ⊇ X.
Theorem 3.1. A capacity vector u ∈ Z m is enforceable by prices, if F R min (u) has zero duality gap and admits an integral optimal solution x * ∈ X satisfying (x * ) = u.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as in Theorem 2.3. By definition, zero duality gap of F R min (u) implies that there are λ * ∈ R m + , x * ∈ R(X) with
and both solutions are optimal for their respective problems. With x * ∈ X and (x * ) = u, Condition 1. in Definition 1.2 is satisfied. It remains to prove Condition 2. As in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we get x * ∈ arg min x∈R(X) L(x, λ * ). But since X ⊆ R(X) and x * ∈ X, we get x * ∈ arg min x∈X L(x, λ * ). The remaining steps are the same as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
We directly get an associated result for minimal u ∈ Z m .
Corollary 3.2. Let u ∈ Z m be minimal for X. Then, u is enforceable, if F R min (u) has zero duality gap and admits an integral optimal solution x * ∈ X.
Note that the reverse direction in the above corollary does not hold, that is, the existence of an enforceable integral vector u does not imply zero integrality gap of F R min (u). Let us briefly restate the corresponding main result for maximization games. For this, define the following problem.
Denote by F R max (u) a fractional convex relaxation. Corollaries 3.2 and 3.4 describe a clear path towards obtaining existence results for prices enforcing certain capacity vectors u: we need to identify optimization problems of type F R min (u) in realvariables that admit integral optimal solutions. Assuming that X i , i ∈ N are polyhedral and the objectives are linear, this type of question is typically addressed in polyhedral combinatorics, see Schrijver [65] . In this field, conditions like total-unimodularity or total-dual-integrality are important concepts.
Polyhedral Games with Linear Objectives
In the following, we discuss this type of results and review some facts that are relevant here. Let us now consider the case of binary {0, 1} entries of vectors of feasible strategies. Suppose for every i ∈ N , the set X i is of the form:
where A i is a rational k i × m matrix and b i ∈ Q k i is a rational vector. Denote the combined set by
Assume further that the private cost function of a player is quasi-separable over the resources and depends only on the aggregated load vector and the own load on the resource:
where π i,j : Z m → R denotes the player-specific per-unit cost on resource j mapping a vector u to the reals. We use the term quasi-separability in order to emphasize that π i,j still depends on the entire load vector u which is a global non-separable dependency. Let us now consider a minimal capacity vector u ∈ Z m for X, that is, for any x ∈ X with (x) ≤ u we have already (x) = u. Then, problem IP min (u) can be reformulated as the following integer linear optimization problem (ILP):
Denote by LP min (u) the fractional LP-relaxation of problem ILP min (u), that is, we define
Theorem 3.6. Let u ∈ Z m be minimal for X (see Definition 2.5) . If R(X) ∩ {x ∈ R nm | (x) ≤ u} is non-empty and integral, then u is enforceable.
Proof. As u is minimal for X, we get that x ∈ X ∩{x| (x) ≤ u} implies (x) = u. Using the integrality of R(X)∩{x ∈ R nm | (x) ≤ u} and the linearity of the objective function in ILP min (u), there exists an integral optimal solution x * ∈ X of the relaxed problem LP min (u). Since for LP min (u) strong duality holds, all conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied and the result follows.
For the sake of brevity, we do not repeat corresponding results for maximization games.
Aggregation Polytopes and Total Dual Integrality
A powerful tool in polyhedral combinatorics is the notion of total-dual-integrality (TDI) of linear systems (see Edmonds and Giles [29] ). A rational system of the form Az ≥ b with A ∈ Q r×m and b ∈ Q r is TDI, if for every integral c ∈ Z m , the dual of min{c z|Ax ≥ b} given by max{z b|A z = c, z ≥ 0} has an integral optimal solution (if the problem admits a finite optimal solution). It is known that for TDI systems, the corresponding polyhedron is integral. A system Az ≥ b is box-TDI, if the system Az ≥ b, ≤ z ≤ u is TDI for all rational , u. A polytope is called box-TDI, if it can be described by a box-TDI system. Now we return to problem ILP min (u) and assume now that for all i ∈ N , the matrices A i are equal to some matrix A ∈ Q r×m . We further assume that the cost functions are linear and homogenous, that is, they have the form
where π j : Z m → R denotes the resource-specific per-unit cost on resource j mapping a load vector u to the reals. Instead of taking the Cartesian product of the LP-relaxations R(X i ), we define an aggregation polytope:
This aggregated polytope seems only useful, if it is box-TDI and any solution z can be decomposed into feasible strategies. This latter property is called the integer decomposition property (IDP). Formally, P N has the IDP, if any integral optimal solution z ∈ P N can be decomposed into feasible integral vectors, that is, z = i∈N z i with z i ∈ X i for all i ∈ N . We remark that Kleer and Schäfer [48] showed -in a different context -that polytopal congestion games (see Section 4 for a definition) with box-integral and IDP aggregation polytopes have nice properties in terms of equilibrium computation and equilibrium welfare properties. Now we have everything together to state the following result. Proof. Using the homogeneity of cost functions and the IDP assumption on P N , problem LP min (u) can be reformulated as
As P N is box-TDI, there is an integral optimal solution which by IDP can be decomposed into the original sets X i , i ∈ N .
Integral Polymatroid Games
We consider now a class of games based on polymatroids which rely on submodular functions defining structured capacity constraints on subsets of resources. An integral set function f :
and f is normalized if f (∅) = 0. We call an integral, submodular, monotone, and normalized function f : 2 E → Z an integral polymatroid rank function. The associated integral polyhedron is defined as
where for a vector y = (y j ) j∈E and U ⊆ E, we write y(U ) shorthand for j∈U y j . For an integral polymatroid P f , the corresponding integral polymatroid base polyhedron is defined as
We denote by
the relaxed polymatroid base polyhedron.
Suppose there is a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players so that each player i is associated with an integral polymatroid rank function f i : 2 E → Z that defines an integral polymatroid P f i with base polyhedron B f i . A strategy of player i ∈ N is to choose a vector x i = (x i,j ) j∈E ∈ B f i , i.e., player i chooses an integral resource consumption x i,j ∈ Z for each resource e such that f (E) units are distributed over the resources and for each U ⊆ E not more than f i (U ) units are distributed over the resources contained in U . Formally, the set X i of feasible strategies of player i is defined as
where, for a set U ⊆ E, we write x i (U ) = j∈U x i,j . The Cartesian product X = X 1 × X 2 × · · · × X n of the players' sets of feasible strategies is the joint strategy space. Let us now restate problem ILP min (u) in the context of polymatroids.
Let us call LP min − polymatroid (u) the fractional relaxation, where we optimize over
We will show in the following that LP min − polymatroid (u) admits integral optimal solutions -by reformulating ILP min − polymatroid (u) as a polymatroid intersection problem whose underlying intersection polytope is known to admit integral optimal solutions. 1 We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.8. Let u ∈ Z m be minimal for X. Then, LP min − polymatroid (u) admits an integral optimal solution satisfying (8) with equality and, thus, u is enforceable.
Before we prove the theorem, we state some observations. It is known that the fractional relaxation of any individual integral polymatroid base polyhedron EB f i is box-integral -however this does not imply that R(X) ∩ {x ∈ R nm | (x) ≤ u} is also integral. Take for instance the path packing problem in a capacitated graph, where one needs to find k disjoint paths for source-terminal pairs s i ,t i , i = 1, . . . , k in a digraph. For any individual s i ,t i pair, the flow polytope is integral and a feasible path can be computed by shortest path computations. However, computing a path packing for multiple s i ,t i pairs is strongly NP-hard and does not admit a polynomially sized integral LP formulation (unless P = N P ).
Nevertheless, polymatroids carry enough structure so that the combined polytope described in LP min − polymatroid (u) remains integral.
Proof. We first lift all integral base polyhedra B f i ⊂ Z m to the higher dimensional spaceB f i ⊂ Z n·m by introducing n copies E i , i ∈ N of the elements E leading toĒ :=∪ i∈N E i with E i = {e i 1 , . . . e i m }, i ∈ N . The domain of the integral polymatroid function f i is extended toĒ as follows
This wayf i (S) remains an integral polymatroid rank function on the lifted space Z n·m . Note that forx i ∈B f i , we havex i ∈ Z n·m and with f i ({∅}) = 0, we getx ij = 0 for all j ∈Ē \ E i . By this construction, we get x i ∈ B f i ⇔x i ∈B f i . Now we define the Minkowski sumB
which is again an integral polymatroid base polyhedron. By this construction we can represent all collections of integral base vectors by a single integral polymatroid base polyhedron. It remains to also handle the capacity constraint (8) (note that this is not a box constraint for polymatroidB 1 ). For S ⊂Ē, we define S j := {j ∈ E| ∃ i ∈ N with e i j ∈ S} as the union of those original element indices (in E) for which S contains at least one copy. With this definition, we define a second polymatroid as follows. 
By the fundamental result of Edmonds [28, Thm. (35) ], the fractional relaxationĒB 1 ∩ĒB 2 is integral. Note that there are strongly polynomial time algorithms computing an optimal solution to (9) (see Cunningham and Frank [22] and Frank and Tardos [35] ).
We remark that Borndörfer [14] proved a similar result for the special case of matroids and unit integral capacity vectors u.
Utility Maximization on Polymatroids
For the maximization variant, the strategy spaces X i , i ∈ N are usually defined as the vectors of an integral polymatroid polyhedron P f i . We get the following reformulation of ILP max (u):
The following companion result for maximization problems on polymatroids holds true.
Then, for maximization problems on polymatroids, any supply vector u ∈ Z m + for which there exists x ∈ X with (x) = u is enforceable. Proof. With v i,j ≥ 0 it follows that v(x) is monotonically nondecreasing. Moreover, for any integral u ∈ Z m + for which there exists x ∈ X with (x) = u it is known that X is upwards closed -using polymatroid properties. Thus, with the proof of Theorem 3.8 and Corollary 3.4 the result follows.
Applications in Congestion Games
We now demonstrate the applicability of our framework by deriving new existence results of tolls enforcing certain load vectors in congestion games. Moreover, we show how several known results in the literature follow directly.
Nonatomic Congestion Games
We first present results for the case that the strategy spaces of players are convex subsets of R m + . We are given a directed graph G = (V, E) and a set of populations N := {1, . . . , n}, where each population i ∈ N has a demand d i > 0 that has to be routed from a source s i ∈ V to a destination t i ∈ V . In the nonatomic model, the demand interval [0, d i ] represents a continuum of infinitesimally small agents each acting independently choosing a cost minimal s i ,t i path. There are continuous cost functions c i,j : R m + → R + , i ∈ N, j ∈ E which may depend on the population identity and also on the aggregate load vector -thus allowing for modeling non-separable latency functions. A flow for population i ∈ N is a nonnegative vector x i ∈ R |E| + that lives in the flow polytope:
where δ + (v) and δ − (v) are the arcs leaving and entering v, and
, and = 0, otherwise. We assume that every t i is reachable in G from s i for all i ∈ N , thus, X i ∅ for all i ∈ N . Given a combined flow x ∈ X, the cost of a path P ∈ P i , where P i denotes the set of simple s i , t i paths in G, is defined as
A Wardrop equilibrium x with path-decomposition (x i,P ) i∈N,P ∈P i is defined as follows:
The interpretation here is that any agent is traveling along a shortest path given the overall load vector (x). One can reformulate the Wardrop equilibrium conditions using load vectors u stating that -given the load vector of a Wardrop equilibrium -every agent is traveling along a shortest path.
Lemma 4.1 (Dafermos [23, 24] ). A strategy distribution x * ∈ X with overall load vector u := (x * ) is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if
With this characterization, the model fits in our framework and we can apply our general existence result. [78] , Fleischer et al. [31] , Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [44] ). Every minimal capacity vector u is enforceable.
Theorem 4.2 (Yang and Huang
Proof. Define π i (u, x i ) := j∈E c i,j (u)x i,j for every i ∈ N . By the linearity of the objective in P min (u) and the fact that Slater's constraint qualification condition is satisfied, the result follows by Corollary 2.7.
Note that the above result is more general than that of [31, 44, 78] as we allow for arbitrary player-specific cost functions c i,j , i ∈ N, j ∈ E. Previous works assumed less general heterogeneous cost functions of the form c i,
where α i > 0 represents a tradeoff parameter weighting the impact of money versus travel time.
Fleischer et al. [31, Sec. 6 ] also mention that their existence result holds for the more general case of non-separable latency functions.
Atomic Congestion Games
Now we turn to atomic congestion games as introduced in Rosenthal [62] . This setting arises by assuming that d i = 1 for all i ∈ N and requiring that all strategy vectors x i need to be integral, that is, x i ∈ {0, 1} m . As is standard in the congestion games literature, instead of considering network games, where the strategies are paths in graphs, we can associated a set S i ⊂ 2 m of allowable subsets of E with every i ∈ N and the incidence vectors of a set S ∈ S i represent a feasible x i and vice versa. We use in the following the more general model of so-called polytopal congestion games introduced by Del Pia et al. [61] and further studied by Kleer and Schäfer [48] . In this model, the strategy spaces are defined as
where P i are polyhedrons of the form P i = {x i ∈ R m + |Ax i ≥ b i } for some rational matrix A and integral vector b i of appropriate dimension. We remark here that all characterizations regarding box-TDI and IPD also work for systems Ax i = b i or Ax i ≤ b i assuming that A and b i carry the desired structure (see for instance Kleer and Schäfer [48, Prop. 2.1]). In the following, we differentiate between homogeneous cost functions of the form c j ( j (x)), j ∈ E and player-specific cost functions
Homogeneous Cost Functions. Given a strategy distribution x ∈ X, the cost functions of the players i ∈ N are defined as
where c j : Z + → Z represents the cost on resource j given the load j (x). This formulation corresponds to the classical formulation of Rosenthal if the set of incidence vectors x i in X i correspond to a set system S i ⊆ 2 E of allowable subsets of resources. Let us formally state the definition of a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. prices λ ∈ R m + .
Definition 4.3.
A strategy distribution x ∈ X with overall load vector (x) is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game on (N, X, π) with cost functions π as in (10) and prices λ ∈ R m + :⇔
where (
For applying Theorem 3.7, we need a few more insights. The cost function of player i has the form π i ( (x), x i ) and depends on (x). However, we can state the following sufficient condition on the existence of Nash equilibria x ∈ X with u = (x).
Lemma 4.4. Assume that cost functions c j , j ∈ E are nondecreasing. A strategy distribution x * ∈ X with overall load vector u := (x * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game (N, X, π) with cost functions as in (10) and prices λ ∈ R m + , if
Proof. Let i ∈ N and y i ∈ X i . For y i denote E(y i ) := {j ∈ E|y ij = 1} the support of y i . We calculate
where (12) follows from the optimality of x * i for problem (11) and (13) follows from the monotonicity of the cost functions c j , j ∈ E.
Clearly the condition (11) is only sufficient for enforcing u and not necessary. Fotakis and Spirakis [34] termed prices λ that induce equilibria x with the property stated in (11) cost-balancing. Now we can use Theorem 3.7 to state the following result. [40] and Kleer and Schäfer [48] for a definition) 3 . Intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids (see Kleer and Schäfer [48] for a definition) 4 . symmetric totally-unimodular games (see Del Pia et al. [61] for a definition) including matching games,
Asymmetric matroid games (see Ackermann et al. [1]).
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, it suffices that for every player i ∈ N , condition (11) is satisfied. With this condition, the result follows by Theorem 3.7.
Note that by box-integrality and IDP of P N , any u ∈ Z m + that minimizes a strictly component-wise monotonically increasing function is enforceable. In particular, for monotonically increasing functions c j ( (x)), j ∈ E, a vector u ∈ Z m + corresponding to a minimum cost solution, that is, u = (x * ) for some
is enforceable. The congestion vector u minimizing the (weakly convex) social cost can be computed in polynomial time (see Del Pia et al. [61] and Kleer and Schäfer [48] ) and additionally the space of enforcing prices can be described by a compact linear formulation. This allows for optimizing arbitrary linear objective functions (like maximum or minimum revenue) over the price/allocation space. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous results for the existence of (optimal) tolls are due to Marden et al. [52] , Fotakis and Spirakis [34] and Fotakis et al. [33] . Marden et al. [52] proved that marginal cost tolls enforce the minimum cost solution by charing the difference between the social cost and the cost of Rosenthals' potential. With this approach, there is no control on the magnitude of price and no structure for optimizing secondary objectives over prices. In addition, for other (non-optimal) vectors u, this approach does not work. Fotakis and Spirakis [34] proved that any acyclic integral flow in an s,t digraph can be enforced. It is not hard to see that the notion of minimality of u for X exactly corresponds to the set of acyclic integral s,t flows. Fotakis et al. [33] generalized this result to single source multi-sink network games allowing even for heterogeneous players.
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Cost Functions. Now we turn to the general model of player-specific non-decreasing separable cost functions c ij ( j (x)), i ∈ N, j ∈ E and consider the case of integral polymatroid congestion games, see Harks et al. [42] . In this model, for every i ∈ N , the strategy space X i is the integral base polyhedron B f i of a polymatroid P f i . If we assume that vectors in To the best of our knowledge, this is the first existence result of enforceable tolls in congestion games with player-specific cost functions. One might be tempted to think that -as in Theorem 4.5 -one can use the aggregation polytope P N and also show integrality of optimal solutions to LP min (u) for natural classes such as s,t network games with player-specific cost functions. Note that this approach does not work, because the objective function depends on the player's identities on the elements and not on an aggregate. The following result shows that, unless P = N P , even for s,t network games with homogeneous cost functions but heterogeneous players, LP min (u) is not integral in general.
Theorem 4.7. Unless P = N P , problem LP min (u) does not admit integral optimal solutions for all symmetric s,t network congestion games with heterogeneous players and separable and nondecreasing homogeneous cost functions.
Proof. Consider an instance of the directed disjoint path problem, where we are given a directed graph G = (V, E) and 2 source-sink pairs (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , 2. The task is to decide whether there are 2 arc disjoint s i ,t i paths P i , i = 1, 2. This problem is strongly NP-hard (see Fortune et al. [32] ). We transform this problem to an instance of ILP min (u) as follows. We introduce a super source s and a super sink t and connect s via a directed arc to every source s i , i = 1, 2 and every t i , i = 1, 2 to t. The nondecreasing and separable costs for the new arcs are defined as
All other costs c j , j ∈ E of the original edges are defined as follows, where C > 0 is a large number.
The cost functions c j , j ∈ E ∪ {(s, s i ) i∈N , (t i , t) i∈N } are nondecreasing and homogeneous. We define α 1 = 1 and α 2 = C. This way, we make sure that, if there are two disjoint paths connecting the s i ,t i , then, the lower sensitivity of player 1 with respect to the congestion cost ensures that player 1 also uses the correct (s, s 1 ) and (t 1 , t) arc. For the capacity vector u = (2, . . . , 2) we get that there are 2 directed disjoint s i ,t i paths in G if and only if ILP min (u) has an optimal solution of value less than 2. Thus, the relaxation LP min (u) of ILP min (u) cannot be integral, because, otherwise, we could decide the 2-directed disjoint path problem in polynomial time.
We remark that the above reduction does not rely on the hardness of checking whether or not the integral space X ∩ { (x) ≤ u} is non-empty since with u = 2, we can always find an integral s,t flow of value 2.
Application to Market Equilibria
We now consider market games and first present a classical model of Walrasian market equilibria with indivisible items. Then, we study a class of valuations for multi-item settings that allows for some degree of externalities of allocations.
General Valuations without Externalities
We are given a finite set E = {1, . . . , m} of items and there is a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} interested in buying some of the items. For every subset S ⊆ E of items, player i derives value w i (S) ∈ R giving rise to a valuation function w i : 2 m → R, i ∈ N, where 2 m represents the set of all subsets of E. The seller wants to determine a price vector λ ∈ R m + so that all items are sold to the players and every player i ∈ N gets a subset S i of items that are maximizers of her quasi-linear utility, that is, S i ∈ arg max S⊆E {w i (S) − j∈S λ j }. Such an allocation is known as a competitive Walrasian equilibrium. A natural condition on valuations is normalization and monotonicity as stated below.
1. w i (∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
w i (S) ≤ w i (T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ E and all i ∈ N.
A fundamental property of valuations w i , i ∈ N is the so-called gross-substitutes condition defined below. Denote by D i (λ) = arg max S⊆E {w i (S) − j∈S λ j } the set of maximizers for i ∈ N given price vector λ. The condition requires that whenever the prices of some items increase and the prices of other items remain constant, the agent's demand for the items whose price remain constant only increases. Let us recall an existence theorem by Kelso and Crawford [47] .
Theorem 5.2 (Kelso and Crawford [47] ). For GS valuations, there exists a competitive Walrasian equilibrium. 2 We present now two ways to prove this result: the first proof uses discrete convexity arguments (cf. Murota [56] ) while the second follows standard LP-duality (cf. the monograph by Vohra [74] or the survey by Paes Leme [50] ). Both proofs are well known in the literature, however, the aim is to show that both proofs fit into the unifying duality framework of this paper. In the subsequent section, we present an existence result for a class of multi-unit market games.
Proof based on Strong Duality in Discrete Convexity. In the first way, we can use Theorem 2.8 by showing that problem P max (u) has zero duality gap for the supply vector u = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R m . One can show this property by using insights from discrete convexity and the special form of M functions, see Murota [56, Sec. 11.3] for a definition and an exhaustive overview of the topic.
We formulate problem P max (u) directly using incidence vectors x i ∈ {0, 1} m on the set E together with a constraint ensuring that every item is sold to at most one agent. Thus, problem P max (u) becomes
where v i (1, x i ) := w i ({j ∈ E|x ij = 1}). Let us now recall a characterization of Fujishige and Yang [37] .
Theorem 5.3 (Fujishige and Yang [37]). A normalized and monotone valuation function is GS if and only if it is M .
It is known that if all v i , i ∈ N are M , so is i∈N v i . Altogether, we obtain a very special discrete optimization problem with an M function over {0, 1} n·m involving the special constraint (x) ≤ 1 which constitues a hierarchy, see Yokote [80] for further details. Yokote [80] proved that such a problem has zero duality gap. Thus, with the zero duality gap property, the monotonicity of v(x) and the upward-closed property of X (unsold items can be given to buyers for free yielding only higher valuation), Theorem 2.8 implies Theorem 5.2. We remark here that Yokote [80, Sec. 4] described in his paper the connection of his strong duality theorem (in the realm of discrete convexity) with the existence of market equilibria for GS valuations.
Proof based on Strong Duality of Lifted LPs.
A second (well-known) proof is based on linear programming duality and integrality of optimal solutions, see Nisan et al. [58, Chapter 11] . We present it here as a special case of Corollary 3.4 using a lifted formulation as described in Section 2.3. Let us introduce the lifting variable y i,S ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N, S ⊆ E with the understanding that y i,S = 1 means that player i receives the set of items S. Then, we can describe the valuation function v i (1, x i , y i ) and the space X i as:
together with
Note that the first constraint S⊆E y i,S ≤ 1 ensures that player i gets at most a single set of items, while the second inequality y i,S ≤ x i,j for all j ∈ S, S ⊆ E ensures that whenever y i,S = 1, then also x i,j = 1 for all j ∈ S. Prescribing a supply vector u = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R m , ensures that we have exactly one unit of every item and the inequality (x) ≤ 1, ensures that we sell only the available items. In order to apply the previous results, we need to check whether
has zero duality gap and admits an integral optimal solution, where R(X) denotes the standard fractional LP-relaxation. Since the combined valuation function v(x, y) is monotonically non-decreasing in (x, y) and X is upward-closed, there always exists an optimal solution satisfying (x) = 1. As the objective function v i (1, x i , y i ) solely depends on y i , we can eliminate the variable x i and define an equivalent problem only in the variable y i,S ≥ 0, i ∈ N, S ⊆ E:
For the above problem, Bikchandani and Mamer [12] (see also Shapley and Shubik [66] ) have shown that there is an integral optimal solution with zero duality gap -and that this condition is even necessary for the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Item Multiplicity, Additive Valuations with Externalities and Polymatroids
Now we turn to a multi-item model that allows for several items of the same type and some degree of externalities of allocations. There is a finite set E = {1, . . . , m} of item types and every item may be available at a certain multiplicity. Assume further that X i ⊂ {0, 1} m , i ∈ N . This implies that every player wants to receive at most one item per type -however X i may still carry some combinatorial restrictions for feasible item sets for player i ∈ N . Suppose that valuations of players are additive over items, that is,
where v ij : Z + → R + is the nonnegative value player i gets from receiving an item of type j assuming that item j is sold to j (x) many players. This formulation is not directly comparable to the one before. On the one hand side, additivity of valuations over items is less general. On the other hand, several items of the same type can be sold and we allow for a functional dependency of the valuations with respect to the load j (x). Such dependency may be interesting for situations, where the value v ij (·) of receiving item type j drops as other players also receive the same type -in economics this is usually referred to as a setting with negative externalities.
Assumption 5.4. For every i ∈ N, j ∈ E, the functions v ij are nonnegative and exhibit negative externalities, that is,
The model so far does not satisfy the assumption of a maximization game G max (u) augmented with prices, as the utility of a player is allowed to depend on the load vector (x). In the following lemma, however, we state a sufficient condition under which a load vector u can be enforced for the game in which utilities depend on the load vector. This condition can be used to study a game of type G max (u) augmented with prices. Lemma 5.5. A strategy distribution x * with u = (x * ) is a market equilibrium for prices λ ∈ R m + , if
Proof. We get the following series of inequalities for any other strategy y i ∈ X i ⊆ {0, 1} m :
where (17) follows by the optimality of x * i for the maximization problem (16) and (18) follows by Assumption 5.4.
With this insight, we get the following result using Theorem 3.9. Proof. With Lemma 5.5 and the non-negativity of the v ij , the result follows from Theorem 3.9.
Homogeneous Valuations and Polytopal Strategy Spaces
Now we discuss the special case of homogeneous separable additive valuations, that is,
where v j : Z + → R + is a nonnegative and nonincreasing valuation function. Similar as in Section 4.2, if we assume that X i = {x i ∈ {0, 1} m |Ax i ≤ b i } for some rational matrix A and integral b i , we can study the aggregation polytope P N and identify problem classes for which P N is box-TDI and has the IDP. This way, we can obtain similar results as those in Theorem 4.5. Interesting applications arise in the context of network settings, where players are interested in buying paths in a graph.
Theorem 5.7. Let X i , i ∈ N be polyhedral (as described above) and assume that valuation functions are of the form (19) . Let u ∈ Z m + so that there exists x ∈ X with (x) = u. It also follows that one can enforce a socially optimal supply vector u, that is u = (x * ) for some x * ∈ arg max
This vector u can also be computed in polynomial time, because with the monotonicity of v j , j ∈ E, the objective function is discrete concave, leading to a tractable integer program (see Del Pia et al. [61] and Kleer and Schäfer [48] ). Also the compact representation of enforcing prices/allocations as described in Section 4.2 carries over.
Application to Congestion Control in Communication Networks
In the domain of network-based TCP congestion control, we are given a directed or undirected capacitated graph G = (V, E, u), where V are the nodes, E with |E| = m is the edge set and u ∈ R m + denote the edge capacities. There is a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and every i ∈ N is associated with an end-to-end pair (s i , t i ) ∈ V ×V and a bandwidth utility function U i : R + → R + measuring the received benefit from sending net flow from s i to t i . As in congestion games, a flow for i ∈ N is a nonnegative vector x i ∈ R |E| + that lives in the flow polyhedron:
x i,j = 0, for all v ∈ V \ {s i , t i }    , where δ + (v) and δ − (v) are the arcs leaving and entering v. We assume X i ∅ for all i ∈ N and we denote the net flow reaching t by val(x i ) := j∈δ + (s i ) x i,j − j∈δ − (s i ) x i,j , i ∈ N . The goal in pricebased congestion control is to determine edge prices λ j , j ∈ E so that a strategy distribution x * is induced as an equilibrium respecting the network capacities u and, hence, avoiding congestion. The equilibrium condition amounts to
We obtain the following result for concave bandwidth utility functions.
Theorem 6.1 (Kelly et al. [45] ). For concave bandwidth utility functions U i , i ∈ N , every capacity vector u ∈ R m + is weakly enforceable. Proof. With the concavity of U i , i ∈ N , problem P max (u) is a convex optimization problem over a polytope and hence satisfies Slater's constraint qualification conditions for strong duality. Thus, Theorem 2.8 implies the result.
Let us turn to models where the flow polyeder X i is intersected with Z m + . Most of the previous works in the area of congestion control assume either that there is only a single path per (s i , t i ) pair or as in Kelly et al. [45] , the flow is allowed to be fractional. Allowing a fully fractional distribution of the flow, however, is not possible in some interesting applications -the notion of data packets as indivisible units seems more realistic. The issue of completely fractional routing versus integrality requirements has been explicitly addressed by Orda et al. [59] , Harks and Klimm [41] and Wang et al. [76] . Using the TDI and IDP property of network matrices, we obtain the following result for integral flow polytopes. Proof. We can write X i = {x i ∈ Z m + |Ax i = b i } for all i ∈ N , where A is the graph incidence matrix of G and b ij = 0 for all j ∈ V \ {s i , t i } while for s i ,t i there are no constraints. Then, we can use the aggregation polytope P N as in Section 4.2, equation (7). The assumption on bandwidth utility functions implies the form U i (z) = az, a ≥ 0, i ∈ N . Thus, the aggregated utility can be written as As the objective is linear and P N is box-TDI, this LP admits an integral optimal solution. By the IDP property of P N , we can decompose an integral optimal solution and the result follows. One can also interpret LP max (u) as a max-flow problem on a slightly changed instance, where we introduce a super-sink and connect all t i 's to the sink with large enough capacity. This way, we obtain a standard max-flow problem which is known to admit integral optimal solutions. Remark 6.3. The above proof shows that for a capacity vector u ∈ Z m + , we can compactly represent the enforcing prices/allocation space and efficiently optimize linear functions over it.
Conclusions and Extensions
We introduced a generic resource allocation problem and studied the question of enforceability of certain load vectors u via (anonymous) pricing of resources. We derived a characterization of enforceable load vectors via studying the duality gap of an associated optimization problem. Using this general result, we studied consequences of known structural results in the area of linear integer optimization, polyhedral combinatorics and discrete convexity for several application cases.
Understanding duality gaps of optimization problems is an active research area, see for instance the progress on duality for nonlinear mixed integer programming (cf. Baes et al. [5] ). Thus, our general characterization yields the opportunity to translate progress in this field to economic situations mentioned in the applications.
A further consequence of the proposed framework is the enforceability of load vectors u using mixed or correlated equilibria. For these equilibrium concepts, the strategy space of a finite strategic game is a (convex) polytope and if the cost/utility function of the extended game (e.g., the cost/utility function of the mixed extension) is convex in the randomization variable, we have strong duality of the master problem P min (u) and enforceability results for expected load vectors follow.
For our general model we assumed that the strategy spaces are subsets X i ∈ R m , i ∈ N . This assumption is not necessary for proving our main result. We could have chosen X i as a Banach space and the results would have gone through. In fact, in the area of dynamic traffic assignments (cf. Friesz et al [36] ), the flow trajectories live in function spaces, thus, offering the possibility that our characterization on Banach spaces yields the existence of (time varying) tolls for these applications too.
